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This chapter reviews the current state of RMB internationalization and highlights the links between capital account opening and RMB convertibility, on the one hand, and the controversies within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership over the speed of economic and financial liberalization, on the other. I argue that the Chinese discussion about RMB internationalization is mainly motivated by domestic debates about financial sector reform. In particular, the widely popular notion of establishing the RMB as a global currency has been promoted by those seeking domestic financial reform as a way to overcome the reform resistance coming from various factions within the Chinese government and economy.
International currency policy is therefore primarily used for the purpose of achieving domestic policy goals, rather than for changing the global financial order or supporting larger foreign policy goals. My argument thus relates to earlier literature on China's economic opening and reform, much of which highlighted "domestic politics [as] the primary source of policy changes in China's reform and opening" (Moore 2002: 35) .
The chapter is structured as follows. After briefly reviewing the literature on international currencies in Section 1, Section 2 summarizes the incremental steps toward currency internationalization that the Chinese authorities have taken thus far. Section 3 analyzes the political economy of China's domestic financial market and capital account reforms and establishes the link to the discussion on RMB internationalization. It suggests that neither a foreign policy lens nor a purely economic efficiency one captures key elements in the decision-making process of today's Chinese leadership; instead, domestic political economy considerations appear to play a major role. While there are domestic interests that support RMB internationalization, they are opposed by powerful party factions, state-banks, and state-owned enterprise constituencies that perceive themselves as likely to lose from such policies. Section 4 discusses China's broader ambitions to augment its stature in the regional and global economy, and discusses the ways in which FS -the active use of monetary and financial instruments, including promotion of the RMB as an international reserve currency -has been employed to pursue this foreign policy goal. My conclusion argues that a rapid and comprehensive liberalization of China's capital account is improbable. It is therefore equally unlikely that the RMB will take on the dollar's role as the premier investment and reserve currency anytime soon, even as the RMB is established as a leading currency for trade. The likeliest scenario in the next two decades is the emergence of a multi-polar international monetary system, with the US dollar, the euro, and the RMB in the lead roles and smaller regional lead currencies in Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, and Central Asia in the second tier.
I. International reserve and investment currencies
The international monetary system is characterized by currency competition and a hierarchy of currencies. Cohen (1998: 114) compares currency competition to a "vast, threedimensional pyramid: narrow at the top, where a few popular currencies dominate; increasingly broad below, reflecting varying degrees of competitive inferiority." Several factors establish a currency's rank in this international currency hierarchy, and whether a currency will be able to become a major international or "global" currency, which will be used not only as invoicing currency for trade, but that will also be a major investment currency in the portfolios of international investors and reserve currency held by central banks.
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As Minsky (1986: 228) observed, "everyone can create money; the problem is to get it accepted." The easiest way to have one's IOUs accepted is to generate liabilities for others that can only be extinguished through possession of these IOUs (Kregel 2006) . A government can domestically enforce the acceptance of its currency through the fiscal system (and up to a certain degree through its legal system) by creating a tax liability on its citizens that can only be redeemed in the form of money issued by the government. But this does not work internationally, as a government can tax its own citizens, who are subject to government regulations, but cannot force non-residents to hold claims. The only way to make the currency internationally accepted is by building an expectation that these liabilities will act as perfect substitutes for the liabilities of other countries' monetary authorities.
A number of conditions can be identified that contribute to building such expectations.
First, confidence in a currency's future value is dependent on the political stability of the country of origin (Cohen 2000) . This is the quintessential precondition for establishing a track record of relatively low inflation and low inflation variability. Second, countries need sound and credible fiscal institutions. In conjunction with noninflationary wage and price policies, a sound fiscal framework lays the groundwork for a noninflationary monetary environment with low nominal as well as real interest rates. Third, countries need to establish credible monetary regimes. Unpredictable monetary policy makes market participants unsure about the future real value of their assets issued in domestic currency and may lead them to denominate them in international currency (Jeanne 2005) . Establishing a strong, (de facto) independent central bank with strong inflation aversion and a clear monetary policy objective is an important way to pin down inflationary expectations and to reduce this uncertainty.
Fourth, avoiding international debt, and instead striving for a surplus in the trade and current account helps to create expectations of an appreciation of the national currency. From a long-term development perspective, it is not the short-term stabilization of the exchange rate that is of central importance but rather the currency's long-term value. The quality of a nation's currency is undermined when a currency regime is chosen that achieves price and exchange rate stabilization at the cost of an increase in the country's foreign debt. Instead, countries need to develop the ability to generate foreign reserves by generating export surpluses.
2 Such a strategy is helped by a tendency toward an undervaluation of the currency, as illustrated by the successful adopters of this development strategy such as West Germany in the 1950s and Japan in the 1960s and 1970s. The East Asian tiger economies -and then China -have very successfully followed this strategy more recently.
But developing sound fiscal and monetary institutions and generating export surpluses will not suffice to achieve key currency status. The literature on the determinants of key currency status points to another factor, namely the size of the economy. Matsuyama, Kiyotaki, and Matsui (1993) explain the international use of currencies and, succinctly, the determinants of key currency status as a function of relative country size and the degree of international economic integration. Because of network externalities and transaction costs, the global portfolio is concentrated in only a handful of currencies. In some ways money is comparable to language, whose usefulness is also dependent on the number of people with whom one can communicate; similarly a currency's utility rises with the number of other market participants using the same currency (Dowd and Greenaway 1993) . A currency's attractiveness also increases with its transactional liquidity, which in turn is dependent on the existence of well-developed and broad domestic financial markets that offer a wide range of short and long-term investment opportunities in that currency, as well as fully operating secondary markets (Cohen 2000) . Eichengreen, Hausmann, and Panizza (2005) point out that larger countries offer significant diversification possibilities, while smaller countries add fewer diversification benefits relative to the additional costs they imply.
As a result of these factors the global portfolio is concentrated in a small number of currencies (those at the top of the international currency pyramid) for reasons partly beyond the control of even those countries that follow sound domestic policies. Developing key currency status is hence a very difficult and perhaps even impossible endeavor for small economies. Eichengreen et al. (2005) show larger economies to have less of a problem borrowing in their own currency than do smaller economies. Using different measures of size, their estimates suggest that economic size is robustly and negatively correlated to "original sin," i.e., a situation where it is impossible for a country to borrow abroad in its domestic currency.
Taking into account these conditions, China certainly has the potential to elevate the RMB to key currency status. Assuming continuous economic and political stability in China (admittedly a significant assumption), China can be expected to replace the US as the world's largest economy in the foreseeable future, even if the country's growth rate slows significantly compared to the 10 percent annual average recorded over the past three decades.
Although the People's Bank of China (PBOC, sometimes abbreviated PBC), China's central bank, is not institutionally independent, China's leadership is generally inflation averse and likely to continue to grant the PBOC sufficient operational independence to prevent high inflation, given that the latter could cause social unrest. 3 Last but not least, China has been running significant current account surpluses, which have been driving appreciation expectations.
However, as many studies have highlighted, there are also conditions that China does not fulfill at the moment: In particular, China is currently lacking deep and liquid capital markets; the RMB is not fully convertible (i.e., it is not freely tradable in global currency markets); and the capital account is still tightly regulated (e.g., Prasad and Ye 2011, Volz 2013) . Without a further opening of the capital account and convertibility of the RMB, the latter cannot assume a major international role besides being an invoicing country in (mostly regional) trade. Nonetheless, China's government could, in theory, implement the necessary policies fairly quickly, and with foreign portfolio capital inflows domestic Chinese capital markets would probably then see considerable growth. Moreover, taking into account the historical experience of the US dollar, which went from having no international role to being the leading international currency in less than a decade (Eichengreen 2011), we could indeed see the RMB rise to key currency status very quickly.
In practice, however, reform of the capital account and convertibility of the RMB are hotly contested issues in China. Moreover, these reforms necessarily are linked with reform of the domestic financial sector, since the capital account cannot be fully liberalized before the overhaul of the interest rate setting system, among others, is completed. The speed of reform is hence not yet decided. Before analyzing the preferences of different interests within China with respect to these issues, and what they imply for the reform process and hence RMB internationalization, the next section will briefly review the steps already taken toward capital account opening and RMB internationalization.
II. China's evolving roadmap for RMB internationalization
Since a number of recent studies, including Cohen (2012a) , Prasad and Ye (2012) , and Volz (2013) , have reviewed the steps taken to liberalize China's capital account and promote the internationalization of the RMB, the following overview is kept very short. A summary of China's framework for capital controls is provided in Table 1 . Major steps taken by the Chinese authorities toward RMB internationalization are listed in Table 2 . represented the first time any Chinese government body had proposed a concrete timeline for RMB internationalization. The draft plan thus boosted discussion about the costs and benefits of capital account liberalization and RMB internationalization, as well as the time horizon over which both should be achieved. The costs and benefits of RMB internationalization will be outlined in the following section, and complemented by an analysis of who is set to benefit, and who to lose, from capital account and domestic financial market liberalization, both of which are essential preconditions for turning the RMB into a truly global currency.
III. The intertwined political economies of RMB internationalization, capital account liberalization, and domestic financial market reforms
This section details the benefits of costs of RMB internationalization for the Chinese economy, then discusses the implications of related reforms of capital account opening and domestic financial deregulation, and the overall political economy of Chinese financial reforms across these various arenas. It concludes with a brief recap of the current reform policies.
Benefits and costs of RMB internationalization
From a Chinese perspective, there are several potential benefits of RMB internationalization. 5 Besides the political prestige of issuing a global key currency, benefits for Chinese firms arise if they can use the domestic currency for international transactions, which means that they can shift exchange rate risk to their trading partners and hence need not hedge. 6 Wider RMB use also would improve Chinese financial firms' international competitiveness. As the international use of the RMB expanded, international loans and investments increasingly would be executed through Chinese financial institutions, which would also help to boost Shanghai as a financial center (Gao and Yu 2011) . Furthermore, China would earn additional seignorage through the international use of the RMB.
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There are, however, also costs of currency internationalization. First, greater international use of a currency implies that international demand for that currency will increase beyond what is needed for domestic uses, which will tend to drive up the currency's value, reducing export competitiveness. For this reason the German Bundesbank and the Bank of Japan both opposed larger international roles for the deutschmark and the yen, respectively.
Given the constant stream of capital inflows into US financial markets over the past decades, which have generated pressure for dollar appreciation and eroded the competitiveness of US exports, Pettis (2011) Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan repeatedly complained that the steady inflow of capital into US financial markets made it impossible for the Fed to raise long-term bond yields.
In the case of China the situation looks a bit different, since China's monetary policy autonomy already has been compromised by the current link to the US dollar (Reade and Volz 2012) . While employing capital controls and relying on instruments other than the interest rate have granted the PBOC leeway to exert relatively autonomous monetary policy, the current arrangement has serious costs. In particular, the PBOC has been constrained in its ability to use interest rate policy effectively. It must keep interest rates low to avoid attracting capital inflows, which would put upward pressure on the country's exchange rate and require the PBOC to intervene in the foreign exchange market and sterilize these interventions through open market operations. It is hence understandable that the PBOC has been seeking to 8 On the politics shaping China's exchange rate policy see Kaplan (2006) and Liew and Wu (2007) .
push reform of the exchange rate regime with a view to strengthening of the monetary policy transmission mechanism and overcoming the need to continuously accumulate dollar reserves -which comes at great cost for the Chinese economy. On a more general level, RMB internationalization can be thus seen a means to overcome the dependency on the US dollar.
Keeping nominal interest rates low has led to negative real interest rates for deposits.
The average annual real return on one-year deposits in Chinese banks has been negative since 
Winners and losers from capital account opening and domestic financial liberalization
Since exchange rate and capital account reform have ramifications for domestic interest rate liberalization and hence for reform of China's financial sector at large, the discussion on RMB internationalization has to be seen in the context of the interests of the different stakeholders that will be affected by such reforms. As is often the case with reforms, financial market reform in China will produce both winners and losers. Many interests benefit from the status quo and thus tend to oppose either RMB internationalization per se, or other policy shifts such as domestic financial liberalization which are logically linked to RMB internationalization. These typically anti-reform constituencies include large state banks, state-owned industrial enterprises, the NDRC, and the Ministry of Finance.
For Chinese banks -which are primarily state-owned and enjoy oligopolistic rentsthe negative real deposit rates have been like subsidies. With a ceiling on deposit rates and a floor on lending rates, banks have gotten used to living with a "comfortable margin of around 3 percent" (Borst 2012a ). According to Borst (2012a) , "Xiao Gang, the chairman of the Bank of China, estimated in 2010 that the non-liberalized interest rate regime in China gave banks a net interest spread twice as large as that for foreign currency loans in the international market." With interest income accounting for 80 percent of bank income in 2011, Borst (2012a) points out that "a narrowing of the interest rate spread has serious implications for bank profitability." It is hence not surprising that the major banks have been strongly opposing interest rate reform -which would be unavoidable if the capital account were to be opened. In April 2012, then Premier Wen Jiabao, generally considered a champion of the proreform faction in government, openly criticised the "monopoly" profits of state-owned banks and called for a shake-up of the current system. The four biggest state-owned banks, which dominate the banking system, had an average return on equity of about 26 percent in 2011 (cf.
WSJ 2012: C24). They would be clear losers of financial market reform. Not only would the banking sector have to forego the negative real deposit rate subsidy it currently enjoys.
Capital account opening would also open the Chinese financial sector to outside competition and erode the profits banks were able to extract in a hitherto oligopolistic (state-owned)
system.
Low interest rates have also benefited state-owned enterprises (SOEs), which have enjoyed monopoly privileges in many sectors, and which also have received cheap funding from the state-owned banking system. According to Unirule (2011) , a Chinese think tank, "easy access to bank loans at a third of the market rate" (cf. Breslin 2012a: 37-38) has been one of the reasons behind the relatively high profitability of SOEs. 9 Like the banks, the SOEs strongly oppose financial market reform as they would have to cede to rely on cheap (and essentially subsidized) finance and face increasing competition from the private sector. While competition would benefit overall welfare, the SOEs would be hurt. It should be noted that in the Communist Party hierarchy top executives of large SOEs routinely wield as much power as the government ministers who formally supervise them. Their strong opposition to domestic financial liberalization has therefore been a significant blockage to reform.
Interest rate liberalization and a lifting of the restrictions on capital outflows would also hurt the real estate and construction industries, which have profited from the negative real deposit rates and a lack of alternative investment opportunities that have made residential property a preferred asset class (so much that this has led to a property bubble).
Moving toward a more market-based financial system would also require the government (and the CCP) to give up much of its influence over the domestic banking system, which thus far has been one of its most powerful tools in steering the economy (and which is also increasingly used to enlarge Chinese influence abroad, as will be discussed later). As Breslin (2012a: 36) points out, the state's control over the financial sector has been central to remaining at the "commanding heights" of the economy.
Finally, financial market reform would also have far-reaching and in the short run adverse implications for public finances. As pointed out by Shih (2012) , the central government is directly or indirectly the largest debtor of the financial system. Interest rate liberalization, which would drive up deposit and lending rates, would significantly raise the government's borrowing costs. Shih estimates that every basis point increase of the interest rate imposes an additional RMB6.9 billion of interest payments on state-owned debtors.
Moreover, market-based interest rates may also threaten the survival of numerous SOEs, which would create additional costs for the government.
On the winning side of financial liberalization would be households, who would be freed of the current financial repression tax. Lardy (2012a) estimates that interest rate liberalization would boost household income by two percent. 10 In addition, abolishing the cap on deposit rates and increasing bank competition would improve small and medium enterprises' access to credit. While the current lending rates are low, these benefit SOEs, while small and medium private enterprises are typically excluded from credit, and have been forced either to rely on internal earnings or seek credit in the shadow banking sector. Marketbased interest rates would help alleviate this problem and reduce the power of SOEs over the economy. The majority of the Chinese private sector therefore supports market-oriented financial reform since they can expect improved access to credit. Indeed, small and medium private enterprises have called for speeding up reforms, but generally speaking lack political clout. Finally, there have been also calls from private Chinese investors, frustrated with the limited range of investable assets in China, to allow capital outflows.
Vested interests and the political economy of financial reforms
The pro-reform constituencies have had a strong ally in the central bank, the PBOC, whose officials believe that financial liberalization is necessary to rebalance the economy and improve the functioning of the economy at large. Moreover, it is clear that interest rate reform Even though most economists (including those within China) would agree that financial market reform is needed and that it would benefit the overall economy, expert opinion differs as to the urgency and ideal sequencing of reforms. Moreover, reforms are hampered by the vested interests of the beneficiaries of the current system. As Huang (2012) observes, "policymaking is not as unified as it seems to the amateur observer", and "
[r]esponsibilities are compartmentalised under different senior leaders and "leading groups"
and therefore they are vulnerable to capture by vested interests."
The NDRC and other branches of government that are hesitant to move ahead with financial market reform and capital account opening regularly point to the dangers that capital account opening can bring for financial stability. Indeed, a fast liberalization of the capital account entails the risk of financial crisis, as seen by the crises experienced in countries like South Korea and Mexico shortly after financial opening. It is particularly risky to open too fast without having a sound domestic financial sector and a well-developed capital marketas is the case in present China. Since financial and economic crisis could cause social unrest and political instability, and threaten the survival of the current political system, it is unlikely that the reformers will be able to go forth with a swift liberalization and economic reform.
Against this backdrop, coming forward with the above-mentioned three-step plan for liberalizing the capital account over the next decade can be seen as an affirmation by the PBOC of the irreversible goal of RMB internationalization in response to recent increasing domestic doubts and debates (Gao and Volz 2012) . It also transmits the message that the strategic time for China to open up its capital account is now, and that the risks of opening are controllable. The PBOC downplays the risks of opening the capital account and argues that the need to establish preconditions such as domestic interest rate marketization, the introduction of greater exchange rate flexibility, and similar policies before capital account opening should not be over-emphasized. Specifically, the PBOC has highlighted four reasons why the potential risks of financial opening are small (cf. Gao 2012): (1) the risk of currency mismatches is limited since both the assets and the liabilities of Chinese commercial banks are mainly denominated in domestic currency; (2) Chinese foreign reserves are mainly invested in bond markets, so that market fluctuations have minimal impact on revenues; (3) short-term foreign liabilities account for a small portion of China's overall foreign debt; and (4) domestic property and asset price developments are under control.
There is no doubt that PBOC is aware of the risks of current account opening. Hence, one can safely assume that it does not actually expect the proposed reforms to proceed within its suggested time frame, in the context of determined resistance from the anti-reform camp.
Given the public's benign view on RMB internationalization as a reflection of China's growing statue in the world, the current debate on RMB internationalization may be understood as an attempt of the PBOC to push for domestic financial market reform -which is the precondition for current account opening -and also for a reform of monetary and exchange rate policy (Gao and Volz 2012) . 11 Some would even argue that PBOC Governor
Zhou Xiaochuan "conned" CCP leaders when he convinced them "in 2009 to try to make the yuan an international standard" by using "the language of economic nationalism to push an agenda that ultimately would loosen state control of the economy by making the yuan […] more dependent on market forces than government orders" (Davies 2011). Davies (2011): referred to this approach as "a Trojan horse strategy: Make the policy arguments so attractive that decision makers will approve the ideas without realizing the implications -like the Trojans accepting that beautiful horse from the Greeks without realizing what was inside."
The PBOC's announced tentative three-stage liberalization plan thus may have been in the nature of a trial balloon to test for public sentiment on this matter -with the Chinese public's responses including both applause and anger. As noted by Gao (2012: 10-11) , 11 On the sequencing of reforms, see Yu (2012) .
immediately after the PBOC publicized its three-stage plan, "an instant critique appeared in both Chinese and overseas media," with some pundits comparing the proposed current account liberalization to an "opening of the floodgate" and inviting foreign "wolves" into the Chinese "sheep's house." Reformers utilize the RMB internationalization discussion as a means of fostering financial sector reform, similar to the way that the earlier goal of China's entry into the World Trade Organisation (WTO) was used to push through far-reaching economic reforms in the late 1990s. 12 This discourse is still ongoing, and the speed at which the reforms will move ahead is not yet determined. To overcome opposition to reforms, the new Chinese leadership will have to show "political courage to deal with vested interests" and the willingness "to cushion the cost of change for those who will lose out in the reform process" (Huang 2012 ).
However, sooner or later policymakers will need to enact some type of financial reform. The problems associated with the current financial repression are building up, and the case for financial market reforms, especially interest rate reform, is becoming ever stronger.
The negative real interest rates offered on deposits have led investors to consider alternative financial investments. 13 Increasingly, banks have to compete for funds by offering so-called "wealth management products," which are short-term savings instruments with yields higher than the regulated deposit rates. While wealth management products offer choices for more 12 According to Chow (2003) , "[t]he main motivation of Premier Zhu Rongji in promoting China's entry into WTO was to use foreign competition to speed up economic reform in both the industrial and service sectors", where reforms had slowed down in the late 1990s "because of the inertia coming from vested interests of a group of formerly appointed managers holding on their positions". On reforms in the agricultural and financial sector ahead of China's WTO entry see Lin (2000) . 13 As a recent article in the Financial Times put it, "[p]ublic anger is mounting at the banks' huge profits and their monopolistic power. It is not quite Occupy Jinrongjie (Financial Street) in Beijing, but regulators are finding themselves on the back foot as they try to defend banks.
[…] Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, the country's largest bank, has recorded average profit growth of 35 per cent over the past five years.
[…] China has been spared the expense of a direct bailout, but the rules that cap deposit rates and limit bank competition add up to a large hidden tax on savers.
[…] More worrying for China's mollycoddled banks is that popular frustration is beginning to turn into action that could hurt them: not complaints or protests, but withdrawal of money. Savers are depositing cash outside traditional bank accounts in a growing array of "wealth management products". These offer savers higher deposit rates, forcing banks to compete on interest rates, eroding margins and denting profits. While far from a crisis yet, it is an alarming trend for banks. Public anger, not pure economics, might be the undoing of the Chinese banking model." (Rabinovitch 2012: 20) affluent investors and reduce the profit margins of banks -which in the view of some "amounts to a de-facto liberalisation of interest rates" (The Economist 2012) -the proliferation of such structured and largely unregulated investment vehicles also leads to a build-up of risk in the (shadow) financial system.
Furthermore, financial repression and the constrained access to formal credit for small and medium enterprises has caused the informal financial sector to mushroom. By some accounts, at least one-quarter of all financial transactions are now carried out in the informal financial sector (Ayyagari et al. 2010) . A 2013 report by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences put the size of the shadow banking sector (comprising all shadow-lending activities including wealth-management products, trusts to interbank business, finance leasing and private lending) at RMB20.5 trillion ($3.35 trillion) at the end of 2012, the equivalent of 40 percent of GDP, although foreign banks and rating agencies have come up with much larger estimates (Zhu 2013 ). According to Allen et al. (2005) , credit created outside formal banklending through alternative financing channels -including through informal financial intermediaries, internal financing, trade credit, and alliances of various forms between firms, investors and local governments -has been crucial for supporting the growth of the Chinese economy. However, the growth of shadow finance, which also includes loans arranged by banks but not recorded in their books, has created considerable risks for financial stability. To reign in these risks and prevent a further uncontrolled development of the informal and shadow financial sector, financial reform is crucial.
Recent advancements with reforms
Despite the difficult political economy of reform just detailed, progressives have continued to push for reforms, and modest progress has been recently made in some areas. For instance, in June 2012 the PBOC granted banks more flexibility in setting deposit and lending rates: while banks hitherto had no room at all to deviate from the official benchmark deposit rate and lending rates were only allowed to be 10 percent below the benchmark lending rate at most, the new rules for setting interest rates allowed banks to offer interest rates to depositors that are 10 percent higher than the benchmark deposit rate and make loans at 80 percent of the benchmark lending rate. A month later the limit on lending rates was further reduced to 70 percent of the benchmark rate set by the PBOC. But even if this liberalization was a move in the right direction, it introduced only little flexibility to the interest rate setting system.
In July 2013 the PBOC made further advancements in reforms when it announced to remove the floor on lending rates and allow financial institutions to price loans by themselves, which is a significant step towards interest rate liberalization. China's domestically-traded banking shares fell sharply the first trading day after the PBOC made this announcement, reflecting the expectation that interest rate reform will hurt the bank's profitability (WSJ 2013). 14 However, the PBOC did not remove the ceiling on deposit rates, which arguably is the most binding interest rate control (Feyzioğlu et al. 2009 ). Relaxing controls on deposit rates will have much more significant effects on the profitability of banks and the wider economy. How long it takes for interest rate liberalization to be completed remains to be seen.
An experiment that has generated huge interest and fuelled the hopes of reformers is the financial liberalization pilot program in the city of Wenzhou, which was approved by the . Since RMB internationalization without a clear sequencing strategy could cause trouble for China's banking system, capital account liberalization can be expected to proceed very gradually -probably at a pace that is much slower than the PBOC plan would suggest. This is particularly true in the face of fierce opposition to reforms from the beneficiaries of the current system, which have "acquired disproportionate influence over economic policy" and which to date "have been able to block much-needed policy reforms" (Lardy 2012b ).
Given that financial repression and regulated interest rates are "at the heart of the Chinese financial machine" (Sender 2012: 22) and a key element to the CCP's influence over the Chinese economy, financial reform is hardly a minor technical change to the current system, but rather a very far-reaching structural policy shift and a major regime change. But as Pettis (2013: 3) points out, it is not clear yet whether the Party leadership has developed the "political will to face down opposition to any change in a growth model that has been extremely profitable for some very powerful sectors within the economy." As Davies and Wei (2013) remarking that "with the reform blueprint in place, the key now is to put that blueprint into reality step-by-step".
Thus, it appears that, at least rhetorically, President Xi's administration is committed to sweeping economic reform, including financial liberalization. However, this was also true for President Hu's administration, whose reform record is widely seen as disappointing.
Possibly the most significant decision taken at the Third Plenum was to set up a "Leading Small Group on Comprehensively Deepening Economic Reform" to manage the economic transformation and coordinate the work of powerful ministries and commissions (Anderlini 2013 ). This new body, which will concentrate power over the economy directly under President Xi's control, may indeed increase the chance that reforms will progress in the direction indicated at the Plenum and that they will be completed as planned by 2020. Yet success is not given. As Moses (2013) points out: "China's reformers are still plodding along a very tough track. The path they've laid out is laudable, but it's still far from certain that they will be able to navigate it to the end."
IV. China's international ambitions and the diversity of its financial statecraft
This chapter primarily has focused on the domestic political economy of Chinese financial policymaking. Does this imply, then, that decisions on international financial choices such as currency internationalization and capital account liberalization are really not
foreign economic policies at all? No. As discussed, the notion of developing the RMB into a major -and in the longer run perhaps the major -international currency, resonates well with the Chinese public and the political leadership. Elevating the RMB to a prominent status in the world economy that can rival the dollar is part and parcel of an ambitious vision to reposition China as the leading economic power, not only in Asia, but in the world economy.
Although this vision is not framed as an official foreign policy goal, it is backed by the belief, widely held by policy elites as well as the general public, that China is now leaving behind a century of humiliation and regaining its deserved role in the world. Policymakers harken back to China's golden era of wealth and power before it fell prey to imperial subjugation from the late 19 th century onwards. A leading international role for the RMB resonates well with "the Chinese Dream of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation" (CCP 2013).
Given the growing strength of China's economy and the swelling of China's foreign exchange reserves over the past decade, FS has been a powerful way for China to extend its stature in the regional and global economy. Besides the steps taken toward RMB internationalization, Chinese leaders have verbally criticized "reckless" fiscal and monetary policy on the part of the US, which China accuses of destabilizing the global monetary system. China's international FS also includes contributions to regional financial and monetary cooperation (see this volume's contribution by Katada and Sohn), granting of credit and aid to foreign entities through the state-owned financial system, and the country's engagement with international fora such as the G20 and BRICS.
But despite its potential, it appears that China thus far has lacked a coherent strategy of international FS, as it often responds to outside developments rather than attempting to actively shape the international agenda. In other words, China's FS often appears defensive and reactive, rather than offensive and creative. Its role in regional financial and monetary cooperation in East Asia is a case in point. Although China, now the largest Asian economy, aims to be a regional leader, it has been hesitant to fill this leadership position. Most of its moves toward greater regional financial and monetary cooperation have come as a response to initiatives from other East Asian countries, especially Japan, whose government has sought to position Japan as the leading economic power in the region. Both countries appear to be involved in a strategic game for regional leadership that has developed into a "competition for regional cooperation" (Volz and Fujimura 2009; Volz 2010 ).
Examples of Japan-China competition spurring the Chinese government to greater initiative in the international financial sphere are not difficult to discover. For instance, the Chinese government at first responded negatively to the Japanese proposal in 1997 to create an Asian Monetary Fund. Yet only two years later, it was the Chinese foreign minister who called on the ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers to establish a framework for regional financial cooperation, which then resulted in the launch of the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) in 2000.
But even after its establishment, China has been hesitant to support bold moves to develop the CMI into a full-fledged regional monetary fund and was seen as responding to proposals by the other ASEAN+3 nations rather than actively setting the agenda. In particular, China has been reluctant to increase its financial contributions and also to de-link disbursement under the CMI (or CMIM, as it has been called since it was "multilateralized" in 2010) from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Apparently Chinese leaders have been worried about the risk of moral hazard, whereby countries would be encouraged to be less prudent than they otherwise would be, knowing that the regional fund was available to bail them out. 16 China has thereby missed an opportunity to show leadership in strengthening the regional financial architecture. China still has a relatively low per capita income, but given that the country has by far the 16 The fear of moral hazard is shared by Japan, the other big contributor to the CMIM. 17 The development of regional financing arrangements has also been a means for emerging economies to demand a greater say in the governance of the IMF. See McKay et al. (2011) . 18 Cf. IMF (2012).
world's largest foreign exchange holdings (which are largely invested at very low or even negative returns in US treasuries), and that lending money to the IMF is virtually risk-free, the opportunity cost of stepping up to the plate and announcing a big contribution to IMF finances early on in the crisis would have been zero, whereas the political gains would have been large.
Of course one may argue that China's hesitation to engage in or contribute to the multilateral system is due to its under-representation in the governance structure of international financial CRA to IMF conditionality -another hint that China, which is set to become the third largest member country in the IMF, does not seek a complete remake of the existing international financial system (and supplant institutions like the IMF where it has increasing sway).
China's reluctance to engage more in the multilateral financial system may be due at least in part to a widely-held view among Chinese scholars and policy makers that "Western attempts to enlist greater Chinese involvement in global management and governance is a dangerous trap aimed at tying China down, burning up its resources, and retarding its growth" (Shambaugh 2011: 13) . But as Katada and Sohn (2012: 19) point out, despite apparent suspicion and skepticism regarding global governance in Chinese policy circles, policy makers believe that China must involve itself in regional and multilateral cooperation at least to a certain extent, since they don't wish to tarnish China's international image "by behaving like a free-rider on the international system." There seems to be an uneasy relationship between the desire to be seen as a great power, and the responsibilities that being a great power might carry with it. As Breslin (2012b: 1) In general, China has been much more at ease when acting unilaterally, and here it has made the greatest efforts to use its economic and financial power abroad. In particular, besides entering bilateral central bank swap agreements, as mentioned above, China has been actively using its state-owned financial system not only to grant credit to domestic (mostly state-owned) firms investing abroad, but also to fund foreign activities, using its financial leverage as a means of foreign diplomacy and a way to secure the country's strategic interest in gaining access to natural resources or strengthening its commercial ties with other countries. In many cases, Chinese firms and banks have been able to offer comprehensive and financially very competitive packages to foreign governments, for instance in the area of infrastructure financing. 19 Such financing, often in the form of foreign aid, has repeatedly been provided to develop infrastructure in resource-rich countries, helping to expand China's access to energy and other natural resources (Weston et al. 2011). 20 In the framework of this volume, such use of financial and monetary levers to win friends, prestige, and influence abroad clearly is a form of offensive and bilateral FS.
19 Through public backing, China has emerged as a major financer of infrastructure projects in Asia, Latin America, and Africa (e.g., World Bank 2008) . 20 By pursuing its interest largely outside the multilateral framework China has repeatedly received criticism for undermining international standards, such as those set by the members of the OECD Development Assistance Committee for the conduct of their development cooperation programs.
Summing up, China has been actively trying to employ its financial power overseas, but this has mostly happened unilaterally. It typically has been reluctant to engage in regional or global initiatives. Given that a comprehensive reform of the international financial and monetary system -negotiated in a new Bretton Woods-type conference -is very unlikely, the unilateral approach that has dominated Chinese policies thus far may not appear to be the worst strategy, since benefits may accrue more directly. But although investments in strengthening the regional and global financial architecture may be more costly and not yield the same immediate returns as unilateral (or bilateral) initiatives, in the long run a solid multilateral financial architecture would be in China's best interest, given that China has a lot to gain from a stable global economy -and conversely a lot to lose from international financial and monetary instability. Moreover, a stronger commitment to multilateral cooperation would also help to build trust in the Chinese leadership -and trust is certainly needed to develop the RMB into a truly international currency.
V. Conclusions and outlook
Eichengreen (2011) recently observed that the US dollar went from having no international role to being the leading international currency in less than a decade. Similarly, the RMB could be very quickly accepted as a major currency for invoicing and settling trade, as a currency for undertaking financial transactions and investments, and as a major reserve currency for central banks. Whether and when the RMB will become a global lead currency depends to a large extent on economic and political stability in China and on the ability of China's leadership to reform the domestic financial system so that it can stand international competition after financial opening. As argued above, in the face of strong opposition from various special interests and rivaling party lines as well as the risks to overall economic stability from (badly managed) financial opening, rapid liberalization of China's capital account and the domestic financial system is unlikely. However, a strategy of gradual opening is quite likely so that the RMB can be expected to further gain in international importance not only as an invoicing currency for trade, but also for financial transactions. Government-led initiatives, such as arrangements with other central banks, will support this process, but will not be the deciding factor.
What have we learned about FS? One lesson from this chapter's case study of RMB internationalization is that what may appear to the outside world as a rather assertive, offensive, and systemic use of a country's financial capabilities -such as the not infrequent announcements on the part of some Chinese financial officials that their plan is to promote the increased global use of the RMB, displacing the US dollar -may have additional layers of meaning within a country's domestic political economy. Thus one may understand many
Chinese domestic political battles around the goal of currency internationalization to be disguised disagreements over the pace of other domestic economic reforms -rather than struggles over Chinese foreign policy. Hence at present, the Chinese "challenge" to the existing global currency hierarchy through the RMB internationalization comes largely from the Chinese reformers' desire to restructure the country's rigid and inefficient financial sector.
In the short to medium-run, then, we may expect Chinese FS to continue to focus on bilateral and offensive initiatives -such as foreign aid tied to natural resource contracts, or bilateral currency swap arrangements -or on systemic FS, ranging from participation in regional currency arrangements to joining with other large emerging economies in such fora as the BRICS to lobby for greater clout in the international financial institutions.
In the medium to long-run, however, China's options for employing its national financial capabilities for a wide variety of foreign policy goals, political as well as economic, are much wider than those of any other emerging power. Among the BRICS countries, for example, only China has a realistic possibility of providing a major global reserve and investment currency sometime in the future. Yet this chapter has shown why that future will not arrive any time soon.
Nevertheless, RMB internationalization is progressing, and there are already signs that the RMB is becoming a regional lead currency in East Asia (Fratzscher and Mehl forthcoming; Subramanian and Kessler 2012) . Given the great importance of the Chinese economy and its central role in the East Asian trade production network, other countries in the region are now cautiously managing their exchange rates vis-à-vis the RMB, and one can safely assume that it will continue to play a central role in the evolving regional monetary cooperation of East Asian countries (Volz 2010, forthcoming) . Interestingly, it should be noted that the RMB can play this regional role without complete opening of China's capital account. For the RMB to become a serious alternative to the dollar on the global stage, in contrast, a full liberalization of China's capital account will be required. But this would imply that the Chinese government would have to relinquish control over much of its financial system and economy, something the government is not at present prepared to do.
Finally, whether or not the RMB can displace the US dollar as the world's major currency also will depend in no small part on US policies for maintaining the internal and external value of the dollar and keeping US financial markets attractive for international investors. In this respect, the incapacity of the US political system to put the country's fiscal system on a sustainable path, and the resulting recurrent threat of debt default, certainly do not help to increase the dollar's attractiveness. The future role of the euro and European financial markets, in turn, will depend on European countries' willingness to further integrate their economies and financial systems. The most likely scenario over the next two decades is the emergence of a multi-polar international monetary system, with the US dollar, the euro, and the RMB in the lead roles and smaller regional lead currencies in Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, and Central Asia in the second tier. 
